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Introduction and summary
The General Motors (GM) strike during June and
July 1998 showed the extent to which lean manufac-
turing production methods, such as efforts to keep
inventories low and reduce the number of parts sup-
pliers, have taken hold in the U.S. auto sector. As
observers tried to assess the ramifications of this
event, it became apparent that we know much more
about the spatial structure of light vehicle assembly
operations and Big Three (Ford, GM, and Chrysler)
owned parts plants than of the large number of inde-
pendent parts suppliers. In an environment of tightly
linked supply chains, it is important to understand
the spatial nature of these linkages. Such knowledge
would help policymakers assess the economic impact
of regional shocks, such as a strike. In addition, data
on individual customersupplier linkages would facil-
itate the study of the geographic extension of supplier
networks and offer new evidence on the ability of
economic development efforts to attract suppliers
to locate in the same state as a large assembly facility.
Lean manufacturing was pioneered by Toyota
Motor Company in Japan during the 1950s. It has
since become the standard for many manufacturing
companies in Japan and around the world. This pro-
duction system tries to improve on the types of mass
production systems that have been prominent in the
postwar period. Instead of organizing production
according to a preset schedule, it operates on the
premise of a so-called pull system, whereby the flow
of materials and products through the various stages
of production is triggered by the customer. In addition,
the production process itself is subject to continuous
improvement efforts.
The 1998 strike at two GM-owned parts plants in
Flint, Michigan, was about issues related to produc-
tion rates and health and safety. Strategically, however,
it centered on issues pertinent to the implementation of
new production methodsmore efficient production
processes that would reduce the demand for labor in
the assembly plant and efforts by the assembly com-
pany to outsource more of the production of parts.
The strike quickly shut down most of GMs North
American assembly operation. In turn, it caused pro-
duction adjustments at many of the companys inde-
pendent suppliers.
In this article, I examine the spatial structure of
the auto supplier industry and how firms in different
locations interact. First, I document the extent to which
plants are concentrated geographically, that is, the de-
gree of spatial agglomeration, in the U.S. auto supplier
industry. My analysis is based on information on the
location of over 3,000 auto supplier plants. I find that
the auto supplier industry is concentrated in five states
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee
that constitute the so-called auto corridor, which is
defined by interstate highways 65 and 75, extending
south from Michigan to Tennessee. These states are
home to 58 percent of the plants in the study. A closer
analysis of plant locations reveals the importance of
access to highway transportation to ensure timely
delivery of production to customers. I find that hav-
ing suppliers located in the immediate vicinity of the
assembly plant is not necessary to maintain a system
of tight linkages and low inventories. Comparing the
spatial structure of individual assembly networks, I
find them to be remarkably similar. The geographic
concentration is highest for assembly plants that are
located near the heart of the auto corridor, with between
70 percent and 80 percent of supplier plants located
within a days drive of the assembly plant. This sug-
gests a clustering of economic activity at the regional
rather than local level.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Second, I investigate the changing nature of the
geographic concentration of this industry over time.
This analysis is limited by the cross-sectional nature
of the data. However, there are a few cases in which
the data allow a comparison of supplier networks of
different vintages. In addition, I apply a location rule
to a subset of all the supplier plants that allows me
to use information on the location of all light vehicle
assembly plants in the U.S. from 1950 to 1997. Consis-
tently, I find evidence of increased clustering in the
auto supplier industry relative to 30 or 40 years ago.
Literature review
Geographic concentration in U.S. manufacturing
has received greater attention in recent years. Krugman
(1991) suggests that Silicon Valley-style agglomera-
tions may be more the rule than the exception and
that we can learn from them about the source of the
underlying forces.1 Ellison and Glaeser (1997) address
the question of how to properly measure industry
concentration over and above the general level of
concentration in manufacturing. To that end they
develop a model that captures both random location
effects and those caused by localized industry-specific
spillovers and natural advantages. The authors develop
indexes of localization and find almost all industries
to be somewhat localized. In many industries, however,
the degree of localization is small. The authors report
that almost all of the most extreme cases of concen-
tration are apparently due to natural advantages.2
Hewings et al. (1998) analyze the 1993 commodity flow
statistics, using a detailed econometric inputoutput
model, to learn about a slightly different issue: To what
extent are the states of a specific region (the Midwest)
linked economically? They find very strong evidence
of industry clusters at the regional level. For example,
in the case of the auto industry, an initial loss of auto-
motive production in Michigan would create secondary
effects that are heavily concentrated in the Midwest.
Specifically, losses in the Midwest would represent 43
percent of the secondary effect outside of Michigan.
Addressing these issues for the U.S. auto indus-
try, several studies suggest that the assembly plants
for light vehicles have reconcentrated in the Midwest
and Southeast since the mid-1970s (Rubenstein, 1992;
McAlinden and Smith, 1993; and Rubenstein, 1997).
Rubenstein (1997) attributes this to the demise of the
branch plant assembly system, whereby identical
models were produced around the country at assembly
plants that were located close to population centers.
Developments in the supplier industry are not as
clear cut. Apparently there has been a migration of
especially labor-intensive parts production to the
southern U.S. and south of the border; however,
parts requiring highly skilled labor, such as engines,
transmissions, and large stampings, have remained
heavily concentrated in the Midwest. That is espe-
cially true for parts plants operated by the auto as-
semblers themselves (so-called captive suppliers)
(see table 1).
As for the potential location effect of lean manu-
facturing, the prevailing anecdotal evidence suggests
that the application of lean manufacturing techniques
has resulted in a tiering and consolidation of the sup-
plier base of the auto industry, as well as a higher
degree of communication and interaction between
suppliers and assemblers (Helper, 1991). Has this
resulted in tighter geographical linkages between
assembler and supplier plants? Proponents suggest
that close linkages work most effectively when sup-
plying and receiving plants are in reasonably close
proximity (Estall, 1985; Kenney and Florida, 1992;
Mair, 1992; and Dyer, 1994). However, there is also
evidence that spatial clustering is not a necessary
outcome of lean manufacturing applications. What
ultimately matters is the quality of transportation
infrastructure in combination with the capability of
delivery management systems in ensuring predictable
on-time arrival of goods. This might well be achieved
with no significant increase in clustering at the indus-
try level.
A set of studies specifically investigates the exist-
ence of effects of lean manufacturing on the spatial
structure of the auto supplier industry. Rubenstein
and Reid (1987) and Rubenstein (1988) analyze the
changing supplier distribution of U.S. motor vehicle
parts suppliers. Their thorough analysis of supplier
plants located in Ohio cannot establish a clear-cut
effect of lean manufacturing on plant location, yet the
authors find evidence of a change in the locational
pattern after 1970.
TABLE 1
Distribution of captive parts plants
(percent)
Share of captive suppliers
 in  MI, IN, and OH
Assembly company Plants Employees




Source: ELM International, Inc., 1997, “The ELM GUIDE
supplier database,” East Lansing, MI, database file, and
author’s calculations.20 Economic Perspectives
Most of the existing analysis of the location effects
of lean manufacturing, however, concerns Japanese-
owned manufacturing establishments within the U.S.
This is not surprising, as these plants generally apply
lean manufacturing. In addition, most of them repre-
sent new plants established at newly developed,
so-called greenfield sites. As their location decision
usually does not involve a re-location, they are a pre-
ferred object of study. Woodward (1992) investigates
what determines the location of Japanese manufactur-
ing start-up plants in the U.S. The author estimates
location models of the spatial behavior of Japanese-
affiliated manufacturing investments undertaken be-
tween 1980 and 1989. While his observations include
plants from many different manufacturing industries,
he estimates a model specification at the county level
for 250 observations in the MichiganTennessee auto-
motive corridor. Woodward finds proximity to urban
areas not to be important for these plants; however, an
interstate connection linking counties to major markets
appears to be crucial. Reid (1994) tests the effect of
just-in-time inventory control on spatial clustering in
observing the level of inputs purchased locally for a
set of 239 Japanese-owned manufacturing plants in
the U.S. The author performs this analysis at three
different levels of aggregationcounty, state, and
national. He finds differences in the proportion of
material inputs purchased locally between plants that
use just-in-time inventory control and those that do
not only at the county level. This result suggests
spatial clustering effects on a very local scale. Smith
and Florida (1994) test for the existence of agglomera-
tion effects in the location decisions of over 400
Japanese-affiliated manufacturing establishments in
automotive-related industries. They perform a formal
analysis for all U.S. counties, as well as an automotive
corridor subset, and find that Japanese-affiliated sup-
pliers prefer to locate in close proximity to Japanese
automotive assemblers. On a regional scale, they find
a concentration of Japanese auto suppliers in the
auto corridor.
Spatial characteristics data
In this article, I present evidence on the spatial
characteristics of independent auto supplier plants
located in the U.S., with particular emphasis on link-
ages between supplier and assembly plants. First, I
document the extent to which plants are concentrated
geographically, or the degree of spatial agglomeration,
in the U.S. auto supplier industry. Second, I investigate
the changing nature of this geographic concentration
over time.
Publicly available data do not provide this level
of detail. The obvious data source, the Census of
Manufactures, can offer only incomplete information,
because it does not distinguish between original equip-
ment manufacturers and producers of replacement
parts. In addition, because of the large variety of parts
that make up an automobile, supplier plants in the auto
industry are classified among 18 of the 20 two-digit
standard industry classification (SIC) codes. Finally,
Census data cannot establish information about link-
ages between supplier plants and their customers.
The basis for my analysis is the ELM GUIDE
supplier database, a set of plant-level data on the
auto supplier industry put together by a private com-
pany in Michigan.3 The data are for 1997 and cover
3,425 independent supplier plants in the U.S.4 As the
database identifies customers for the individual suppli-
er plants, I was able to categorize these plants by sup-
plier tier: 2,008 plants are tier 1 suppliers, that is,
supplier plants that ship their products exclusively
to auto
assembly plants and not to other supplier plants or
other customers; 1,292 are mixed-tier suppliers, that
is, in addition to auto assembly plants, their custom-
ers include other supplier plants and/or nonautomo-
tive assemblers; and 50 observations were excluded
from the analysis because they did not provide infor-
mation on their customers.5
I then added several variables to the database.
For tier 1 plants, I obtained start-up year data from
various state manufacturing directories and phone
calls to individual plants. I added information on foreign
ownership available through industry press reports and
the Japan Auto Parts Industries Association.6 Table 2
shows an ownership breakdown of the industry.
Accounting for incomplete information on start-up
year, I end up with 1,845 individual plant records, rep-
resenting independent tier 1 supplier plants opera-
tional in 1997.7 Next, I analyze data on these 1,845 plants
to test for agglomeration at the industry level, as these
plants arguably represent the subset of supplier plants
that is most closely linked to the auto assembly plants
by way of production and delivery. In addition to the
cross-sectional comparisons, information on the vin-
tage of individual plants allows some comparison of
location patterns of older and recently opened plants.8
The analysis of assembly plant-specific networks draws
on all the 3,137 records of independent supplier plants.9
Industry-level agglomeration
Table 3 presents the distribution of the 3,137
independent supplier plants included in the database.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
It shows the auto supplier plants and employment to
be highly spatially concentrated, with almost 50 per-
cent of all plants located in just three statesMichi-
gan, Ohio, and Indiana. However, it is important to
keep in mind that this information represents plants
from rather different vintages. For example, the oldest
plants in the sample date from the nineteenth century;
38 plants opened prior to 1900. In order to get a bet-
ter read on recent plant location choices, I focus on
the subset of supplier plants that have opened since
1980, marking when lean manufacturing arrived in the
U.S.10 As data on the establishment year are available
only for tier 1 supplier plants, I focus on the subset
of 820 tier 1 supplier plants that opened in 1980 or
after and were still in operation in 1997. While a pure
cross-sectional data set prevents me from testing for
changes in location patterns over time, concentrating
on plants of recent vintage enables me to present the
location choices in a lean manufacturing environment
in much more detail.
Figure 1 shows the plants that opened between
1980 and 1997 and their concentration among the five
states of the auto corridor. Domestic plants are shown
in black, foreign-owned plants in color.  A circle indi-
cates that two or more plants are located within one
zip code. In addition, stars mark the location of light
vehicle assembly plants in operation at any point
during this period. One can clearly see that plant
openings are highly clustered in a northsouth direc-
tion (in southern Michigan and the four states to the
south). Figure 2 adds the grid of interstate highways
to the pattern of plant openings. This exercise dem-
onstrates the relevance of the I-65/I-75 corridor.11
Note, however, that interstate access plays an impor-
tant role for eastwest connectivity as well. For
example, Toyota operates a car assembly plant in
Georgetown, Kentucky, a recently opened light truck
assembly plant in Princeton, Indiana, and an engine
plant in Buffalo, West Virginia. All three of these are
linked by Interstate 64, highlighting the importance
of highway access to ensure timely delivery of ship-
ments in an environment of just-in-time production.
Looking at the auto corridor locations more
closely, figure 3 (page 23) reveals a different location
pattern for domestic and foreign-owned supplier
plants during 198097.12 While they are similarly con-
centrated among three states, foreign-owned suppliers
choose to locate in the southern part of the automo-
tive corridor (that is, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee).
Domestic suppliers, on the other hand, locate in the
northern part, with Ohio being the only state chosen
prominently by both domestic and transplant suppli-
er plants.13 Does this indicate that the auto corridor is
a phenomenon driven by the location of foreign-
owned plants? What explains the apparent different
spatial pattern in plant locations? Do foreign-owned
suppliers respond differently to lean manufacturing
conditions than domestic suppliers? Figure 3 and ta-
ble 4 (page 23) suggest a different explanation: The
difference in the spatial distribution of domestic and
foreign-owned assembly plants seems to dominate
the location choices of supplier plants.14 As a rule of
thumb, between 1980 and 1993 supplier plants located
close to assembly plants of the same nationality.15
This can be seen in figure 3, which distinguishes
between domestic (gray) and foreign-owned (col-
ored) assembly plants.
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Notes: Calculations are based on 3,137 independent
supplier plants open in 1997; numbers do not include
captive supplier plants. Industry employment: 901,343 jobs.
Source: See table 1.
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Auto corridor 57.8 50.4
U.S. 100.0 100.0
Notes: Calculations are based on 3,137 independent
supplier plants open in 1997; numbers do not include
captive supplier plants. Industry employment: 901,343 jobs.
The auto corridor comprises Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
Kentucky, and Tennessee. The Midwest comprises Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Source: See table 1.22 Economic Perspectives
Assembly plant
1 foreign-owned supplier
2 or more domestic suppliers
1 domestic supplier
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FIGURE 1
Plant openings by tier 1 suppliers, 198097
Source: See table 1.
FIGURE 2
Importance of highway transportation for the auto corridor
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Note: For some of the highways, the figure shows only the part that intersects the auto corridor.
Source: See table 1.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Focusing on relationships to primary customers
only would provide more conclusive evidence. How-
ever, the data do not allow identification of the distri-
bution of output among customers. Instead, I present
information on the distribution of supplier plants that
report a particular customer mix. Table 4 shows data
on domestic suppliers that supply only to Big Three
assembly plants, as well as data on Japanese trans-
plant suppliers that do not supply to any Big Three
assembly plants. If the nationality of the assembly
plant customer was important to the location choice
of the supplier plant, one would expect these two
groups to be relatively concentrated in their respective
halves of the auto corridor. Table 4 provides evidence
Domestic assembly plant
1 foreign-owned supplier
2 or more domestic suppliers
1 domestic supplier

















Plant openings by tier 1 suppliers within auto corridor, 198097
Source: See table 1.
TABLE 4
Percent of supplier plants opened in auto corridor, 198097
Domestic Japanese-owned
Supplying only Not supplying
Overall to Big Three Overall to Big Three
Michigan 31.3 40.0 Ohio 20.8 28.6
Indiana 10.9 11.4 Kentucky 18.5 21.4
Ohio 10.4 10.2 Tennessee 13.3 14.3
Tennessee 6.3 4.2 Indiana 11.0 12.9
Kentucky 4.1 1.8 Michigan 9.2 0.0
Top three 52.6 61.6 52.6 64.3
Number of plants 607 166 173 70
Source: See table 1.24 Economic Perspectives
of just such a customer effect, as each group of
supplier plants with a specific customer mix is more
concentrated at one end of the auto corridor.16
This simple comparison between the location
choices of assembly and supplier plants, however,
cannot address the issue of timing. Did assembly or
supplier plants locate first?17 The data allow me to shed
some light on this question for the Japanese-owned
supplier plants. Table 5 shows that 55 percent of
these plants opened between 1987 and 1989, well after
the first Japanese auto assembly plants had started
operating in the U.S.18 That pattern suggests that in
the case of Japanese transplants, the suppliers followed
the assemblers (see also Rubenstein, 1992). However,
the initial location decision of Japanese assembly
plants was undoubtedly influenced by proximity to
the existing, that is, mostly domestic, supplier base.19
Network data
Next, I discuss the extent to which supplier plants
locate near their assembly plant customers. As the
data set includes information on customers of the
individual supplier plants, I am able to construct
supplier networks for specific assembly plants.20 How-
ever, my choice of assembly plants is limited to a set
of essentially single-plant assembly companies as the
supplier plants customer information is provided
only at the company level. I can construct networks
for the following assembly plants: Honda of America,
which opened its Marysville, Ohio, plant in 1982 (and
added a second assembly plant in nearby East Liberty,
Ohio, in 1989); Nissan, which opened an assembly
plant in Smyrna, Tennessee, in 1983; NUMMI, a joint
venture between Toyota and GM, operating in Fremont,
California, since 1984; AutoAlliance, which started as
a joint venture between Ford and Mazda in 1987 in
Flat Rock, Michigan; Diamond-Star, which started
production as a MitsubishiChrysler joint venture in
Normal, Illinois, in 1988; Saturn, GMs attempt to cap-
ture the efficiencies of lean manufacturing, which
started production in 1990 in Spring Hill, Tennessee;
BMW, which opened an assembly plant in South
Carolina in 1994; and Mercedes-Benz, which opened
a plant in Alabama in 1997.
Table 6 presents characteristics of the networks
identified from the database.21 Each network includes
all independent supplier plants that list the respective
assembler as a customer. Not surprisingly, the net-
works vary in size, with Honda, the oldest, being the
largest, and Mercedes-Benz, the most recently opened
assembly plant on the list, the smallest. To measure
the networks spatial characteristics, I calculate the
median distance between supplier and assembler
and the percentage of suppliers located within both
a 100-mile and a 400-mile radius of the assembly plant
(table 6, column seven, ranks networks by percentage
share of suppliers within 400 miles). The 400-mile radius
roughly defines the boundary for a one-day shipping
distance, while the 100-mile distance captures plants
that locate close enough to allow multiple deliveries
using the same truck.22
According to these statistics, the individual net-
works look more alike than different. In general, the
spatial concentration increases toward the heart of
the automotive corridor. The AutoAlliance and Honda
networks are most concentrated within 100 miles
(column five); for the 400-mile criterion, the disadvan-
tage from being located at the fringe of the automotive
corridor mostly disappears. Two cases in point are
the Diamond-Star and Subaru-Isuzu networks, which
are, for the larger radius, essentially as concentrated
as Hondas and Toyotas. The spatial features of sup-
plier networks reported in table 6 seem to be explained
by two factors: where the assembly plant is located
relative to the auto corridor and whether the assembly
plant is domestic or foreign-owned.
TABLE 5
Japanese transplant tier 1 supplier plants
Number of




















Note: Column labeled “Percent” may not total
due to rounding.
Source: See table 1.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
For example, figure 4 shows how Hondas inde-
pendent supplier plants cluster around its two Ohio
assembly plants. The three circles envelop the first
three quartiles of the distance distribution of supplier
plants in the network. The figure shows an assembly
operation that is centrally located in the auto corridor.
It turns out to be the most spatially concentrated net-
work: 17 percent of Hondas 507 suppliers are located
within 100 miles and 77 percent within 400 miles of
the assembly plant.
In contrast, Diamond-Star is located at the west-
ern edge of the auto corridor (see figure 5). There-
fore, it is able to attract only 5 percent of its suppliers
to locate within 100 miles. However, that disadvan-
tage disappears at the 400-mile radius, which, for
Diamond-Star as for Honda, includes 77 percent of
its supplier plants.
The case of Saturn presents yet a different picture.
Its suppliers are relatively dispersed (see figure 6).
Notice the large diameter of the first quartile. Only 35
percent of Saturns supplier plants are operating within
400 miles of Spring Hill, Tennessee. This reflects the
fact that Saturn most strongly relies on domestic sup-
pliers, which are located at the northern end of the auto
region. Its assembly plant, however, is located at the
southern end of the corridor.
Alternatively, one can analyze the concentration
of individual supplier networks relative to the distri-
bution of all the supplier plants. In calculating what
share of the entire industry is located within a certain
radius of the assembly plant, one can then assess a
networks degree of concentration relative to the indus-
try baseline. Table 6, panel A, shows this information
for both the 100-mile and the 400-mile radius. Columns
five and six show that for every single assembly plant
analyzed, a greater share of suppliers is concentrated
within 100 miles than the overall industry distribution
would suggest. At the 400-mile radius (see columns
seven and eight of table 6), one can distinguish two
network groups. The supplier networks of assemblers
located in the northern end of the auto corridor plus
Kentucky represent very closely the industrys over-
all spatial distribution. However, the five assembly
plants located in Tennessee, Alabama, South Carolina,
and California are far more concentrated than the indus-
try, even at that relatively large radius. What drives
that result is the large number of suppliers operating
at the northern end of the auto corridor. For example,
TABLE 6
Spatial characteristics of supplier networks, 1997
Network Industry Network Industry
Assembly Start-up Number of %  Median  %<100 %<100 %<400 %<400
company year suppliers Domestic distance miles miles miles miles
A.
Honda 1982 507 65 251 17 9.4 77 74.8
Toyota 1988 452 69 285 10 4.2 76 75.7
Subaru-Isuzu 1987 292 60 245 9 6.2 76 71.8
Diamond-Star 1988 286 63 309 5 1.7 72 69.3
AutoAlliance 1987 360 71 242 29 24.7 65 66.4
Nissan 1983 460 70 423 10 3.8 45 36.7
BMW 1994 119 75 477 20 3.7 42 26.6
Saturn 1990 300 81 462 8 3.4 35 32.4
Mercedes-Benz 1997 77 68 610 8 0.8 34 17.5
NUMMI 1984 178 60 1,966 6 0.8 11 2.4
B.
Flint (1950) 1907 126 72 192 28 77
Ford (1970–80) N.A. 222 89 405 18 55
Ford (1983–93) N.A. 301 77 200 31 66
Note: N.A. indicates not applicable.
Sources: G. Rex Henrickson, 1951, Trends in the Geographic Distribution of Suppliers of Some Basically Important
Materials Used at the Buick Motor Division, Flint, Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Institute for
Human Adjustment; ELM International, Inc., 1997, “The ELM GUIDE supplier database,” East Lansing, MI,
database file; and author’s calculations.26 Economic Perspectives
suppliers in Nissans network that are located within
400 miles of the Tennessee assembly plant represent
a far greater concentration of auto suppliers in the
region than indicated by the distribution of all sup-
plier plants.
The different spatial distribution of domestic and
foreign-owned supplier plants across the auto corridor
is reflected within the individual networks as well. For-
eign-owned supplier plants are clustered much more
densely around Japanese assembly plants than domes-
tic suppliers (see, for example, Honda, Toyota, and
Nissan in table 7 on page 29). Yet even for that
group, less than one-third of suppliers are located
within a two-hour drive, or 100 miles, of the assembly
plant. This represents a considerably smaller degree of
spatial concentration within lean manufacturing than
previously reported in the literature.23 The case of
Saturn represents a domestic auto assembler whose
network is not very spatially concentrated. This ap-
plies to both its domestic and foreign-owned supplier
plants (quite in contrast to Nissan, which is located not
very far from Saturn). Finally, AutoAlliance shows the
effect of being located in the heart of the traditional U.S.
auto region. Its network includes by far the largest per-
centage of suppliers within a 100-mile radius. At 31.9
percent, that share is significantly higher for domestic
suppliers than for foreign-owned suppliers (21.9 percent).
The analysis of the regional concentration of
supplier networks at that disaggregate level can again
be complemented by a comparison with the industry
level of spatial concentration. For the 100-mile radius,
table 7 (columns three and four) shows a higher degree
of concentration for both domestic and foreign-owned
suppliers within each network than is indicated by the
overall distribution of the industry. At the 400-mile ra-
dius (columns five and six), the differences between
these two measures of spatial concentration disap-
pear in most cases. Noteworthy exceptions are the
most recently opened assembly plants to the south and
east of the auto corridor (Mercedes and BMW) and
NUMMI. Saturn is the only domestic assembly plant
in the study. Its network shows a smaller percentage
of within-network foreign-owned suppliers within 400
miles of the assembly plant than the overall industry
Assembly plant
1 supplier plant
2 or more supplier plants
FIGURE 4
Hondas supplier network, 1997
Note: The circles around the assembly plant indicate the closest 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of the supplier network, respectively.
Source: See table 1.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
level would suggest. The spatial distribution of Saturns
network presents a stark contrast to that of Nissan,
the other assembly plant in Tennessee.
Changing industry structure?
To what extent are these observations indicative
of changes in the spatial pattern of auto supplier
plants? I address that question in three different
ways. First, I compare the structure of different net-
works over time. From Henricksons (1951) analysis
of the supplier structure of the Buick city assembly
plant in Flint, Michigan, it is possible to reconstruct
that assembly plants supplier network (see table 6,
panel B, page 25) and compare it with a current net-
work (Honda) that operates based on a different
manufacturing system.24 It turns out that the median
distance is statistically different for these two networks;
however, the percentages within 400 miles are not
statistically different. In other words, during the prime
of the manufacturing system perfected by Henry Ford,
one of its showcase plants, GMs Buick city plant,
had a supplier structure that was remarkably spatially
concentrated. However, it is important to keep in
mind that such a comparison is not adjusted for dif-
ferent degrees of vertical integration, changes in the
mode and speed of transportation, as well as quality
of the transportation infrastructure since 1950. In oth-
er words, a 400-mile radius in 1950 in all likelihood
represented a smaller degree of spatial concentration
than the same radius in 1997.
Second, I test for differences in spatial concen-
tration for one network over time, using data on one
of the Big Three assemblers, Ford. Instead of construct-
ing networks for each of Fords individual assembly
plants, I use Dearborn, Michigan, as the center of
Fords assembly operations. Since 1970 there have
been two decades, 197080 and 198393, during
which Ford neither opened nor closed an assembly
plant.25 Juxtaposing these two periods allows for an
interesting comparison of the changing spatial pattern
of Fords supplier network (see table 6, panel B on
page 25 and figure 7 on page 30). It shows a marked
Assembly plant
1 supplier plant
2 or more supplier plants
FIGURE 5
Diamond-Stars supplier network, 1997
Note: The circles around the assembly plant indicate the closest 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of the supplier network, respectively.
Source: See table 1.28 Economic Perspectives
increase in concentration of Fords supplier base
around southern Michigan. During the more recent
decade, 31 percent of newly opened supplier plants
located within 100 miles of Dearborn (versus only 17
percent during the earlier decade). Comparing 197080
and 198393, the closures of two California plants
and a New Jersey plant in the intervening years might
have reduced average distances to Dearborn somewhat
(for example, by reducing the percentage of plants
greater than 400 miles away). However, one would
not expect that alone to contribute to the simulta-
neous increase in plants located within 100 miles of
Dearborn.26 Comparing 197080 and 198393, the
statistical tests show all three measures of spatial
concentration reported in table 6 to be different at the
99 percent confidence level, providing strong evidence
of increasing spatial concentration within one of the
Big Three supplier networks.
Third, I ignore the customer information provided
by the database and employ a simple location algo-
rithm, motivated by a Weberian model of plant location,
to link suppliers with assembly plants.27 By applying
a uniform location rule across time for supplier plants,
I can test whether their location decisions changed
over time. To perform this test, I break the sample into
two periods: plants that have opened since 1980, whose
location decisions were presumably influenced by lean
manufacturing constraints, and plants that opened
between 1950 and 1979, when supplier location deci-
sions were influenced by the need to be close to Big
Three operated parts distribution facilities. Comparing
plant locations for these two samples, I can test for a
change in location pattern in two directions. That is, I
can ask if the pattern exhibited by the younger plants
fits that of the older ones and vice versa. Specifically,
for the most recent period I apply two versions of a
location rule that minimizes the distance between
supplier and assembly plant.28 This approach repre-
sents the influence of just-in-time production; supplier
plants in that environment want to be located closer
to the assembly plant to minimize production and
transportation costs. It links the supplier to the closest
operational assembly plant. I do not incorporate infor-
mation provided in the database (and used above)
Assembly plant
1 supplier plant
2 or more supplier plants
FIGURE 6
Saturns supplier network, 1997
Note: The circles around the assembly plant indicate the closest 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of the supplier network, respectively.
Source: See table 1.29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
on actual assemblersupplier linkages. However, in
applying a general location rule I am no longer restricted
to the number of assembly plants listed in table 6, but
can consider all light vehicle assembly plants in the
U.S.29 A slightly different version averages the three
shortest distances between a supplier and operation-
al assembly plants. I apply the location rule to both
sets of supplier plants, resulting in a distribution of
distances for each sample. I then test if the median of
the more recent sample is statistically different from
the median of distances for the older plants.30 If I find
no statistical difference, then the just-in-time location
rule describes both time periods equally well, and
there is no evidence for change in location pattern.
However, if there is evidence of a difference in the
pattern, I interpret this as a strong signal for a change
in the location pattern, as it is established by apply-
ing the same decision rule for both periods. The test
results are described in table 8, panel A (page 31). Under
both versions of the just-in-time rule, median distances
decrease over time. In fact, the differences in the me-
dian are significant at the 99 percent level, according
to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
In testing for a change in location pattern in the
opposite direction, I use the following rule to approx-
imate decisions made by the older supplier plants:
minimize distance to Detroit.31 Prior to the tiering of
the supplier industry, supplier plants would usually
ship their output to a regional parts distribution cen-
ter operated by the Big Three, which in turn directed
the parts to assembly plants around the country. In
recognition of the spatial clustering of auto supplier
plants in southeast Michigan, northern Indiana, and
Ohio, I calculate the distance to Detroit for each plant
that opened during the earlier period. These results
TABLE 7
Spatial characteristics of supplier networks by supplier type, 1997
Network Industry Network Industry
Assembly Supplier Median %<100 %<100 %<400 %<400
company type distance miles miles miles miles
Honda Domestic 280.6 12.7a 8.6a 73.1b 74.6
Foreign 175.2 26.3a 13.6a 83.4b 76.2
Toyota Domestic 311.3 5.1a 2.9a 73.1b 74.8b
Foreign 199.2 19.4a 11.3a 83.5b 80.8b
Subaru-Isuzu Domestic 260.4 6.8a 5.8a 69.9b 71.5
Foreign 206.7 12.1a 8.8a 84.5b 73.2
Diamond-Star Domestic 333.3 2.8a 1.4a 69.3 69.3
Foreign 280.3 8.5a 3.3a 78.3a 69.5
AutoAlliance Domestic 187.7 31.9a 26.4a 66.9 67.5b
Foreign 286.4 21.9a 15.5a 61.9a 60.3b
Nissan Domestic 447.1 7.1a 2.9a 36.6b 32.4b
Foreign 272.1 16.7a 8.6a 64.5b 60.7b
BMW Domestic 494.6 18.2a 3.3a 39.7 22.6b
Foreign 398.0 23.3a 6.1a 50.0a 48.5b
Saturn Domestic 465.8 7.4a 2.7a 32.8 28.2b
Foreign 435.9 8.9a 7.3a 42.9a 55.6b
Mercedes-Benz Domestic 638.7 5.8a 0.7a 26.9 15.2b
Foreign 435.4 12.0a 1.3a 48.0a 30.8b
NUMMI Domestic 1,946.6 6.6a 0.6a 11.3 2.1
Foreign 1,975.5 7.0a 1.9a 9.9a 4.0a
aIndicates too few observations.
bIndicates a difference in the percentages of domestic and foreign-owned suppliers at the 99 percent level of confidence.
Source: See table 1.30 Economic Perspectives
are presented in panel B of table 8. The actual distances
to Detroit increased from 1980 onward, which is not
surprising considering the changing shape of the auto
region in that period. Again, I find the median distances
to be statistically different at the 99 percent level, com-
plementing the result of the first part of the test for a
change in location patterns over time. To summarize, I
find symmetrical evidence for structural change in the
way supplier plants locate around assembler plants.
Both tests suggest an increase in the clustering of
Assembly plant
1 supplier plant
2 or more supplier plants
FIGURE 7
Increase in concentration of Fords supplier
network over time
A. Ford tier 1 suppliers, established 1970–80
B. Ford tier 1 suppliers, established 1983–93
Note: The circles around the assembly plant indicate the closest 25
percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of the supplier network, respectively.
Source: See table 1.
suppliers around assembly plants since
1980 relative to 30 or 40 years ago.
Conclusion
By refining a commercially available
database, this article provides a detailed
look at the supplier networks of some
recently opened auto assembly plants
in the U.S. My analysis focuses on a
description of existing spatial relations
between assembly plants and their tier 1
supplier plants. This study supports
earlier findings about regional agglomer-
ation of supplier plants in the I-65/I-75
automotive corridor. For supplier plants
of recent vintage, the five auto corridor
states, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky
and Tennessee, represent the preferred
location. Within that region, however,
domestic and foreign-owned supplier
plants locate in noticeably different pat-
terns, apparently due to differences in
the location of domestic and foreign-
owned assembly plants.
The evidence I present on the auto
industry supports the view that agglom-
eration economies play out at the re-
gional level (see Hewings et al., 1998). It
does not support the notion that imme-
diate proximity to the assembly plant is
necessary for operating a system based
on tight linkages and low inventories.32
In analyzing the extent of localization of
production around individual assembly
plants, I find networks to be remarkably
similar, with about 70 percent to 80 per-
cent of suppliers located within one days
drive of the assembly plant. Differences
seem to be explained by the location of
the assembly plant in relation to the heart
of the auto corridor as well as by nation-
ality of the assembly plant. Within indi-
vidual networks, the spatial concentration differs
across domestic and foreign-owned supplier plants.
This evidence on spatial agglomeration has
relevance for economic development (see table 9).
The economic development literature has generally
reported on the effects of locating a new assembly
plant on either its immediate and surrounding coun-
ties (see, for example, Fournier and Isserman, 1993)
or on the host state (see, for example, Marvel and
Shkurti, 1993). However, the analysis presented here31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 8
Median distances (miles) between supplier






All 60.4a (649) 52.2a (806)
Domestic 59.6a (605) 47.1a (594)
Closest three avg.
All 108.2a (649) 84.3a (806)
Domestic 105.0a (605) 73.2a (594)
B. Distance to
Detroit rule
All 97.2a (649) 296.7a (806)
Domestic 188.6a (605) 203.0a (604)
aIndicates that the median distances are significantly different
at the 99 percent confidence level, according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of
observations.
Source: See table 1.
allows us to investigate the extent of the regional
distribution of related upstream plant employment in
much greater detail. Take, for example, the case of the
Mercedes plant that opened in 1993 in Alabama. The
state provided incentives worth about $250 million to
attract that plant. However, the evidence presented
on the spatial extension of supplier networks sug-
gests that suppliers to Mercedes will locate not just
in Alabama, but more likely in Tennessee, Kentucky,
and even further north.33 In fact, to date only 35 per-
cent of Mercedess suppliers are located within 400
miles of the assembly plant, and only 16.5 percent of
its supplier employment resides in Alabama.34 In Mer-
cedes case, attractive targets for location
efforts seem to have been foreign-owned companies
(see table 7 on page 29). In short, this type of analysis
suggests that subsidies that are offered by a state
not in the auto corridor are considerably less effective
in terms of attracting a significant portion of the
related supplier employment to that state.
In the case of Toyotas Kentucky assembly plant,
a comparison of my network data on the distribution
of supplier jobs with forecasts projected by a 1992
study also suggests a greater degree of
spatial dispersion of supplier employment
than expected.35
Finally, several tests address the
question of structural change in the
spatial pattern of supplier plant loca-
tions. While limited by the cross-sec-
tional nature of the data available, these
results suggest that the degree of spatial
concentration of supplier plants around
assembly plants has increased since 1980.
The timing of that change is consistent
with the application of lean manufactur-
ing techniques and just-in-time produc-
tion linkages. However, the order of
magnitude of the increased concentra-
tion does not support the concept of a
supplier base that is tightly clustered
around its customers. Within the auto
corridor, the existing infrastructure appar-
ently allows for frequent deliveries to
multiple customers from a single supplier
plant location.
TABLE 9




Company State investment network openedb
($ mil.) (--------------percent------------)
Honda Ohio 21 23.4 27.0
Honda Ohio 67
Nissan Tennessee 33 11.2 21.1
AutoAlliance Michigan 49 21.1 14.6
Diamond-Star Illinois 83 12.9 4.0
Toyota Kentucky 150 14.8 28.9
Toyota Indiana 72
Saturn Tennessee 80 12.1 71.3
Subaru-Isuzu Indiana 86 17.6 22.7
BMW S. Carolina 130 18.1 53.6
Mercedes Alabama 252 16.5 0.0
aSince I do not have information on the distribution of a supplier’s output
across its customers, I adjust the reported plant-level employment by dividing
it by the number of customers per supplier plant. In essence, I am treating all
customers as of equal importance to a supplier. The last two columns report
the percentages of supplier employment in the state of the assembly plant
based on these adjusted employment figures.
bPercentages in this column refer to tier 1 suppliers only as I do not have
information on the start-up year of mixed-tier supplier plants.
Sources: R. Perrucci, 1994, Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland, New
York, De Gruyter; ELM International, Inc., 1997, “The ELM GUIDE supplier
database,” East Lansing, MI, database file; and author’s calculations.32 Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Marshall (1920) identified three reasons for localization: An
industrial center allows a pooled labor market for workers with
specialized skills; an industrial center allows provision of non-
traded inputs specific to an industry in greater variety and at
lower cost; and an industrial center generates technological
spillovers as information flows more easily locally (Krugman,
1991, pp. 3637).
2The authors find the largest coagglomeration for the follow-
ing two upstreamdownstream industry pairs: motor vehicle
parts and accessories (SIC 3714) and motor vehicles, car
bodies (SIC 3711); and automotive stampings (SIC 3465)
and motor vehicles, car bodies (SIC 3711).
3It identifies for each of these the address, the list of products
produced as well as the production processes used, employ-
ment, and the plants customers (at the company level). See
ELM International, Inc. (1997).
4My analysis does not cover the so-called captive supplier
plants. An earlier paper (Klier, 1995) presented a much more
limited analysis of the same issues for a comparatively small set
of data for independent supplier plants operational in 1993.
5It is difficult to accurately assess the coverage of this database,
since the size of the true population is unknown.
6Japan Auto Parts Industries Association (1998).
7About 8.1 percent of the 2,008 tier 1 plant records as provid-
ed by the ELM database could not be tracked down, either in
the manufacturing directories or by phone, and are therefore
not included in the subsequent analysis.
8However, this is not equivalent to a time-series analysis since
the sample only contains plants operating during 1997 and not
those plants that were shut down in earlier years.
9They represent 1,845 tier 1 and 1,292 mixed-tier plants.
10Honda opened its first auto assembly plant in the U.S. in Ohio
in 1982. McAlinden and Smith (1993) refer to the 1980s as a
period of significant structural change for the U.S. automotive
parts industry.
11Woodward (1992) presents empirical evidence of the impor-
tance of highway access at the county level in attracting plant
openings.
12About 63 percent of foreign-owned plants are Japanese;
see table 2.
13Automobile assembly and component plants that are fully or
partly owned by foreign companies are generally referred to as
transplants.
14Smith and Florida (1994) find evidence for such an effect for
their sample of Japanese-owned supplier plants.
15In the case of Japanese assembly plants, this has been well
documented in the context of corporate ties between assembly
and supplier companies (see Reid et al., 1995). For example,
Ohio is perceived by both Japanese assemblers and bankers as
Hondas state (see Rubenstein, 1992).
16There were too few observations for the following two
categories to be reported in the table: domestic suppliers not
supplying to Big Three assembly plants (16 plants) and Japanese
suppliers only supplying to Big Three facilities (nine plants).
However, in both cases the evidence is consistent with table 4.
Plants in these two categories are noticeably less concentrated
in the top three states (31.2 percent for the domestic supplier
plants and 33.3 percent for the Japanese-owned plants).
17See Rubenstein (1997) on the reconcentration of auto
assembly plants in the Midwest and Southeast.
18Only two of the Japanese-owned assembly plants in the study
opened after 1987Diamond-Star and Toyota, both in 1988.
19Reid et al. (1995) suggest that was one of the ways Japanese
assemblers minimized risk and uncertainty related to their
direct foreign investment in the U.S.
20The vast majority of supplier plants (over 90 percent) ship
to multiple customers.
21The tables and maps refer only to supplier plants located in
the U.S. The overwhelming majority of independent suppliers
located in Canada are concentrated in southwest Ontario, be-
tween Windsor and Toronto. These plants are well connected
to assembly plants in Canada and the northern end of the U.S.
auto corridor via route 401.
22All distances are calculated between the respective coordi-
nates of a plants zip code; they are not adjusted for actual
travel routes.
23For example, Kenney and Florida (1992) report data on
approximately 70 Japanese-owned auto supplier plants in the
auto corridor and show 41.4 percent of plants within 100 miles
of their respective assembly plants. In contrast, the highest
concentration of Japanese-owned suppliers around Japanese
assemblers I can find applies to the Honda network, with 29.3
percent of Japanese-owned suppliers within 100 miles of the
assembly plant, followed by Toyota (22.9 percent) and Auto
Alliance (22.5 percent).
24The Buick plant in Flint was at the time one of the largest in-
tegrated automotive plants in the world. It employed about
22,000 people and produced about 2,000 cars a day. Henricksons
data include both independent and captive suppliers of metal
auto parts, tire and tube supplies, and mechanical rubber goods.
25Between 1980 and 1983, three Ford assembly plants closed
(two in California and one in New Jersey). In 1992, a body plant
for Fords large vans in Avon Lake, Ohio, added an assembly line
for the production of the Mercury Villager/Nissan Quest.
26As the opening of the Avon Lake assembly line in 1992 could
possibly explain some of the increase in supplier plants locat-
ing close to Dearborn, Michigan, I checked for robustness of my
results by shortening the second time period to end in 1991. The
exercise leaves the spatial distribution of Ford suppliers that
opened during the 1980s essentially unchanged. This strongly
suggests that the opening of the Avon Lake assembly line is
not driving the reported reconcentration.
27I would like to thank David Marshall, who suggested using
this technique.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
28In calculating these distances, I consider only assembly plants
that were operational when the supplier plant opened.
29From 1950 to 1979, that corresponds to 77 light vehicle
assembly plants; for the later time period, there are 76 plants.
30The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a nonparametric test that
can be used to test whether the median of a set of observations
equals some prespecified value. The test is based on calculating,
ranking, and signing the differences between the actual obser-
vations and the constant. In panel A of table 8, I report the
results from testing whether the median of the more recent
distances between assembly and supplier plants (52.2 miles
in the case of all observations) is different from the median
of the distribution of distances for the older set of observa-
tions (60.4 miles). The test statistic T, which is distributed
approximately normally, is obtained by taking the differences
Di = xi  median8097, where xi represents the actual distances
observed in the older data set. These differences are then ranked
and signed; the test statistic T represents the sum of the signed
ranks. The null hypothesis states that the median difference Di
equals zero. If it cannot be rejected, it follows that the median
distances for both data sets are equal.
31I would like to thank Jim Rubenstein, who suggested this
approach.
32See Reid (1994), Mair (1993), and Kenney and Florida (1992),
who seem to suggest the need for very close proximity between
assembler and suppliers.
33Elhance and Chapman (1992) find similar evidence in ana-
lyzing the labor market of the Diamond-Star assembly plant in
central Illinois. They find that the labor market for that plant
covers a large geographical area, stretching over 15 states.
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